Overall, no international relations theory is perfectly suitable or applicable to the BRICS consortium, indicating a need for newer theories to better capture current developments in world politics. However, various theories complement each other and together these interdisciplinary approaches allow us to gain deeper insight into BRICS. Based on this theoretical approach, we’ve identified several common themes throughout BRICS: principles of pragmatism, non-intervention & sovereignty; multipolar world order & anti-west sentiments; low institutionalisation & lack of cohesion. Additionally, these theories give insight into opportunities and challenges of the BRICS expansion as well as future perspectives.
While an utterly heterogeneous group in various aspects, the BRICS countries are united by their international relations approaches shaped by pragmatism. Hedging and multialignment appear to be common foreign policies for those countries. BRICS countries are pragmatically and strategically seeking various partnerships, hedging their bets against different possibilities and competing interests, pursuing their interests while avoiding a direct confrontation with the US and its Western allies (Duan & Aldamer, 2022; Fulton, 2022; Kapoor, 2023; Konyshev & Sergunin, 2022; Mahdavi, 2022; Özekin & Sune, 2023; Quamar, 2023; Sawal et al., 2023; Sim & Fulton, 2021; Taneja, 2023). Their pragmatic approaches are also reflected in their pursuit of economic and strategic interests with various partners while disregarding potential political or ideological points of conflict, based on the principles of non-intervention and respecting other states’ sovereignty, as can be seen e.g. in their engagement in the MENA region and even more so in the addition of several MENA countries, with more than a complicated and strenuous history (Duan & Aldamer, 2022; Niblock, 2020; Özekin & Sune, 2023; Quamar, 2023; Sim & Fulton, 2021). This pragmatic non-interference approach makes BRICS an especially attractive partner to many non-western states (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2022; Mahdavi, 2022).
BRICS is presenting itself as the voice of the global south and driver of a new alternative multipolar world order, based on their initial goal of multilateral rule-making and reforming major multilateral institutions (BRICS Information Portal, 2009; Özekin & Sune, 2023). While Russia, Iran, and (partly) China are pursuing an Anti-West narrative, BRICS as a group does not present such a common agenda, as several members still hold close ties to the US and the Western-shaped global system (Kapoor, 2023; Mankikar, 2023; Özekin & Sune, 2023; Pant, 2023; Taneja, 2023). Still, for Russia, Iran, (and China to some extent), BRICS proved to be a helpful tool in avoiding Western sanctions and financial independence (Gouvea et al., 2023; Kapoor, 2023; Skaricic, 2023).
BRICS decision-making is entirely consensus-based, rooted in and reflecting their strict adherence to the principle of sovereign equality, mutual respect, and inclusiveness (Department of International Relations & Cooperation Republic of South Africa, 2023). The group involves a low level of institutionalisation , with a general lack of established rules, standards, and procedures, entirely depending on the collective determination of the members to uphold regular meetings, centred around annual summits and common declarations (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2022; Özekin & Sune, 2023).
However, BRICS is most of all a collection of extremely heterogeneous members of diverging internal make-up, economic structures, and foreign policy orientations, including diverging strategic, political, and economic interests and motivations. They don’t appear to have yet developed a coherent group identity to shape and drive unified group actions toward a common goal (Özekin & Sune, 2023; Skaricic, 2023). The heterogeneity as well as the sovereignty of the members pose a challenge to the consensus-based decision-making process and hinder cohesive action (Bhattacharya, 2023; Özekin & Sune, 2023; Skaricic, 2023).
For China and Russia, as two powerful founding members of the group, the expansion serves as an opportunity to present themselves as able to lead and exert influence globally. As such, China was the primary initiator of the expansion, while India, Brazil, and South Africa have shown hesitation and caution at first, concerned about a potential dilution of their respective influences (Mankikar, 2023; Pant, 2023; Seshasayee, 2023). The expansion strengthens BRICS economically, its visibility and weight in international politics, but it also poses further challenges for the group’s cohesion (Özekin & Sune, 2023; Pant, 2023).
Opportunities
On a political level, expansion reflects broad interest in membership by others states, a willingness to look for alternative methods of cooperation as well as the attractiveness of BRICS principles in a transforming and increasingly multipolar world order (Kapoor, 2023; Özekin & Sune, 2023). Economically, it points towards progress in moving towards de-dollarisation and increased financing projects in national currencies (Kapoor, 2023; Özekin & Sune, 2023).
Challenges
The five new members present an additional obstacle to internal cohesion, regarding the increased number of members in respect to the consensus-based decision-making, but also regarding diverging interests and complex bilateral relations (Özekin & Sune, 2023; Skaricic, 2023). Complex internal affairs and possible tensions within members could pose further challenges, as several members have had strenuous relations, including new members like Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia, and original members like China and India (Bhattacharya, 2023; Gouvea et al., 2023; Özekin & Sune, 2023; Taneja, 2023).
Besides the pursuit of purely material and pragmatic interests, BRICS countries are actively using this forum as a platform to strengthen their position as emerging powers and assert their individual relevance in the increasingly multipolar world order (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2022; Özekin & Sune, 2023; Skaricic, 2023). Most of BRICS have managed to create an image as somewhat constructive and peaceful states, preferring pragmatic cooperation to confrontation, while respecting state sovereignty and following a policy of non-interference (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2022; Mahdavi, 2022; Özekin & Sune, 2023). While the expansion certainly poses significant challenges to the internal functioning, the addition and bringing together of historical rivals like Iran and Saudi Arabia, made possible through Chinese mediation efforts, could indicate the possibilities of such an alternative common forum (Bhattacharya, 2023; Gouvea et al., 2023; Taneja, 2023; Yang, 2019).
While their initiatives, e.g. New Development Bank (NDB) or efforts in de-dollarisation , display an organised effort to establish alternatives to existing global financial architecture guided by existing dissatisfaction, their projects are limited in their current ability to bring about large-scale global change due to the vast heterogeneity of the members and a lack of cohesion, common vision, and initiative (Özekin & Sune, 2023; Skaricic, 2023). BRICS currently do not constitute a unified or cohesive power bloc capable of shaping an alternative world order with norms, ideas, institutions, and rules - instead, they might be assessed as a within-system reformist challenge (Fulton, 2022; Konyshev & Sergunin, 2022; Özekin & Sune, 2023).
A collection of some of the most relevant theories regarding BRICS and summaries of how they might apply:
Bhattacharya, S. (2023). Africa: weighing the Promise of BRICS. In H. Pant (Ed.), From BRICS to BRICS Plus: Old Partners and New Stakeholders (pp. 17–21). Observer Research Foundation.
BRICS Information Portal. (2009, June 19). Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders (Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 16, 2009). http://infobrics.org/document/3
Department of International Relations & Cooperation Republic of South Africa. (2023). Three Pillars of Cooperation. https://brics2023.gov.za/three-pillars-of-cooperation/
Duan, X., & Aldamer, S. (2022). The Saudi Arabia–China relationship at a crossroad: A neoclassical realist analysis. Asian Politics and Policy, 14(1), 114–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12619
Fulton, J. (2022). Systemic Change and Regional Orders: Asian Responses to a Gulf in Transition. International Spectator, 57(4), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2022.2107843
Gouvea, R., Gutierrez, M., Gouvea, R., & Gutierrez, M. (2023). “BRICS Plus”: A New Global Economic Paradigm in the Making? Modern Economy, 14(5), 539–550. https://doi.org/10.4236/ME.2023.145029
Guerrero, M. G. (2022). A Neoinstitutionalist Proposal to Study the BRICS. Contexto Internacional, 44(2). https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.20224402e20200120
Kapoor, N. (2023). Russia: Between Optimism and Pragmatism. In H. Pant (Ed.), From BRICS to BRICS Plus: Old Partners and New Stakeholders (pp. 9–12). Observer Research Foundation.
Konyshev, V., & Sergunin, A. (2022). Theoretical Perspectives on BRICS: What Kind of an International Institution Is It? In M. Lebedeva & V. Morozov (Eds.), Turning Points of World Transformation New Trends, Challenges and Actors (1st ed., pp. 101–115). Palgrave Macmillan Singapore.
Mahdavi, M. (2022). The Triple Pillar of Sino–MENA Relations in the Age of Neoliberalism. In M. Mahdavi & T. Keskin (Eds.), Rethinking China, the Middle East and Asia in a “Multiplex World” (pp. 11–34). Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004510005_003
Mankikar, K. A. (2023). China: Laying the Brics of an Anti-West Front. In H. Pant (Ed.), From BRICS to BRICS Plus: Old Partners and New Stakeholders (pp. 6–8). Observer Research Foundation .
Niblock, T. (2020). China and the Middle East: A Global Strategy Where the Middle East has a Significant but Limited Place. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 14(4), 481–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1847855
Özekin, M. K., & Sune, E. (2023). Contesting Hegemony: The Rise of BRICS and the Crisis of US-led Western Hegemony in the MENA Region. The Korean Journal of International Studies, 21(3), 409–446. https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2023.12.21.3.409
Pant, H. V. (2023). From BRICS to BRICS Plus: Old Partners and New Stakeholders. https://www.orfonline.org/research/from-brics-to-brics-plus-old-partners-and-new-stakeholders
Quamar, M. M. (2023). India and the Gulf: Regional security and India’s multialignment policy. Asian Politics & Policy, 15(2), 274–294. https://doi.org/10.1111/ASPP.12682
Sawal, J. N., Zaman, U., & Fatima, N. (2023). Power Transition, Neo Regionalism, and Neo Functionalism: Unraveling the Power Dynamics in BRICS. Global International Relations Review, VI(II), 62–71. https://doi.org/10.31703/girr.2023(VI-II).07
Seshasayee, H. (2023). Latin America: BRICS+: More Than Just an Alphabet Soup? In H. Pant (Ed.), From BRICS to BRICS Plus: Old Partners and New Stakeholders (pp. 13–16). Observer Research Foundation.
Sim, L. C., & Fulton, J. (2021). Implications of a regional order in flux: Chinese and Russian relations with the United Arab Emirates. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 34(4), 551–569. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1800590
Skaricic, A.-M. (2023). Uncharted Waters: The BRICS Expansion and Implications.
Taneja, K. (2023). West Asia: New BRICS Power Brokers. In H. Pant (Ed.), From BRICS to BRICS Plus: Old Partners and New Stakeholders (pp. 22–25). Observer Research Foundation.
Yang, X. A. (2019). Theorizing the BRICS Does the BRICS challenge the current global order? In L. Xing (Ed.), The International Political Economy of the BRICS (1st ed., pp. 37–56). Routledge.