Traditional vs. Nontraditional security
According to Wolfers (1952), traditional security refers to the absence of threats to acquired values (in an objective sense) and the absence of fear that these values will be attacked (in a subjective sense). This approach alludes to security from military threats. Nontraditional security threats can be defined as threats to the security of peoples or states arising primarily from nonmilitary sources, such as food and water shortages, natural disasters, climate change, infectious diseases, irregular migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking or other forms of transnational crime (Srikanth 2014). This definition has been expanded by including topics concerning economic and trade interests, the well-being of the state, social security, political stability, economic development, environmental safety, transnational crime and terrorism, consulting network security (Terriff and Stuart–James 1999, Liu 2004). There is no complete agreement in the literature about which topics belong to traditional and which belong to non-traditional security. I will use the distinction between military and non-military threats. In the following section, we aim to provide an overview of the importance of international security for BRICS (based on Larionova and Kirton (2018), Bratersky and Kutyrev (2019), Brosig (2019) as well as Fracalossi de Moraes (2020)).
Multipolar world order
Russia, India, and China were involved in the creation of two international groups: BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO deals with traditional security problems (political-realist approach) such as terrorism, separatism as well as trafficking of drug and arms. BRICS, however, is more focused on non-traditional security challenges (social constructivist view), so-called critical security studies, especially on questions of international currency exchange, trade, and development. Together, these two groups cover a broad international security agenda that is crucial to establish a multipolar world order, which the BRICS countries have committed themselves to.
Influence on policy formulation rather limited
However, institutionalization tendencies of the BRICS group remain rare and are mostly limited to the economic sector , for example through the New Development Bank. The BRICS' statements on security issues are usually the sum of individual interests. Consequentially, the BRICS member states rather act through established multinational institutions, such as the UN, to shape security policy. However, the BRICS countries are not occupying a leading role at the UN in terms of funding or personnel. Furthermore, only China and Russia hold veto power at the UN Security Council. This significantly limits the influence of the group regarding international policy formulation.
The cooperation depends on the following factors:
Protection of sovereignty and hierarchy
Peace keeping, peacemaking and peace building are viewed with skepticism by the BRICS states (since these can only be accompanied by military intervention). Actions by terrorist groups were increasingly condemned at the BRICS summits. This shows that the BRICS countries share similar preferences concerning the importance to protect the norms of sovereignty and hierarchy. In other words, the BRICS group questions the position of Western powers in the current world order, but not the norms that the international system is based on. On the one hand, this facilitates cooperation, as it gives the governments incentives to use the group to reinforce these norms, as well as to fight against perceived threats. On the other hand, it reinforces concerns about potential interference in their domestic affairs, already existent in countries with a strong sovereigntist tradition, which all five BRICS countries have in common. In fact, the BRICS group generally agrees in key policy areas, but some members are involved in bilateral conflicts . While armed conflicts are mentioned prominently in official BRICS documents , the group does not take a stand regarding conflicts and tensions in which the BRICS states themselves are involved (e.g. the conflict between India and China). This implies that the BRICS would actively take part in solutions for global problems only if they are compatible with the principles of sovereignty and hierarchy. Furthermore, differences of regime type and power asymmetries among the BRICS are likely to hinder cooperation within the group.
Power asymmetries
The area of cybersecurity is very important for BRICS countries for example, as around 40 per cent of all internet users are located within BRICS. This creates an interest for them in cooperating to develop, import or export technologies related to cybersecurity. However, due to cyber threats such as espionage, sabotage and disinformation, the BRICS countries might be suspicious of each other’s intentions. Democratic states could fear that non-democracies might use cybersecurity-related agreements to access privileged information or to interfere in a country’s domestic affairs. The level of China’s surveillance technologies is high above that of the other BRICS states, which increases the likelihood of unequal agreements.
In addition, three of the five BRICS states are nuclear-armed states and all of them have civilian nuclear programs. The newly added BRICS+ country Iran is listed by the Arms Control Association as a State of Immediate Proliferation Concern as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran had an organized nuclear facility involving a uranium enrichment program prior to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that lasted until 2003 and some weapons-related experiments continued until 2009. The country also suspended the Additional Protocol and certain JCPOA-specific measures in February 2021.
Differences of regime type
According to the literature, cooperation is facilitated when regimes are democratic. This could pull the more democratic countries in the BRICS like Brazil, and South Africa away from the group and towards cooperation with other large democracies. However, it depends on how democracy is defined. As an example, according to the Global State of Democracy Initiative (2024), the +countries that joined the group in January 2024 possess a rather low level of democratization across four categories: representation, rights, rule of law and participation. In sum, the democracies of all BRICS+ countries, founders or new participants perform at a low to mid-range level. None of the countries is a high performer in terms of democracy. It is therefore difficult to speak of BRICS+ as a group of countries with very different regime types.
Resource mobilization by domestic interest groups
Cooperation is also more likely to occur when powerful domestic groups (either from the government or from society) are interested in mobilizing resources to push agendas of cooperation regarding a specific topic, especially in democracies. For example, categorizing the production, distribution, and consumption of certain types of drugs (like cannabis) as crime and others not (like alcohol), as well as choosing the methods to fight against them, depends on the influence of interest groups related to this question within a country.
BRICS as a cooperation platform
However, these limitations are not applicable to all areas, and this does not imply that cooperation is not possible at all. For example, Brazil and China have a long history of cooperation in the development of satellites through the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program. The group could work as a platform for the formation of networks involving only some of the BRICS countries that cooperate on a certain issue that is particularly relevant to these states.
Bratersky, Maxim and Kutyrev, Georgy (2019): BRICS and the evolving Russia-India-China security agenda. Strategic Analysis 43(6), 597-619.
Brosig, Malte (2019): Ten years of BRICS: global order, security and peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping 26(5), 521-526.
Fracalossi de Moraes, Rodrigo (2020): Whither security cooperation in the BRICS? Between the protection of norms and domestic politics dynamics. Global Policy 11(4), 439-447.
Larionova, Marina and Kirton, John J. (2018): BRICS and global governance. New York: Routledge.
Liu, J. (2004): Construction of Non-traditional Security and Security Community. World Economy and Politics 2(6), 16-23.
Srikanth, Divya (2014): Non-traditional security threats in the 21st century: A review. International Journal of Development and Conflict 4(1), 60-68.
Terrif, Terry-Croft and Stuart–James, Lucy-Morgan Patrick (1999): Security Studies Today. London: Polity.
The Arms Control Association (2024): Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance. (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat [30.01.2024]).
The Global State of Democracy Initiative (2024): Country Profiles. (https://www.idea.int/gsod/gsod [30.01.2024]).
Wolfers, Arnold (1952): " National security" as an ambiguous symbol. Political science quarterly 67(4), 481-502.